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Abstract. The acquittal of Momčilo Perišić (former Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, right hand of 
Slobodan Milošević during the Balkan wars) received a loud echo both in the affected countries and in the 
international media in 2013. His acquittal was based on an Appeal Judgement including an unconvincing 
interpretation of aiding and abetting liability. The author of the present paper discusses the judicial reasoning 
provided by the Appeals Chambers of the ICTY before the Perišić Appeal Judgement was delivered and 
demonstrates how negligence of judicial chambers can build case law which leaves the door wide open to highly 
debatable judicial conclusions. The paper briefl y presents the 14-year story of the application of the concept of 
aiding and abetting liability by the ICTY Appeals Chambers, from the 2000 Aleksovski Appeal Judgement to the 
2014 Sainović Judgement.
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1. PROLOGUE – CONTOURS OF THE CONCEPT OF AIDING AND ABETTING 
DRAWN BY THE FURUNDŽIJA TRIAL CHAMBER
The contours of the liability concept of aiding and abetting was fi rst drawn at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter, ICTY) by the Trial 
Chamber in the case of Anto Furundžija. The reasoning of the Trial Judgement delivered in 
1998 was based on in-depth analysis of post-World War II cases. The Trial Chamber needed 
to decide upon the issue of whether the presence of the accused, who was a local commander 
of the “Jokers”, a unit of the Croatian Defence Council, at the interrogations and torture of 
the victims and through that his moral support and encouragement was suffi cient to 
constitute the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
Based on the British case of Schonfeld, the Trial Chamber held that in giving additional 
confi dence to his companions the defendant facilitated the commission of the crime.1 In the 
Rohde case, the Chamber found that actual presence at the crime was not necessary to be 
“concerned in the killing” as long as the defendant reassures the perpetrators and facilitates 
the commission of the crime in some signifi cant way.2 Having analysed the Akayesu, the 
Dachau Concentration Camp and the Auschwitz Concentration Camp cases, the Trial 
Chamber drew its conclusion with regard to the evaluation of the physical presence of the 
defendant at the crime scene and the issue of silent approval. The defendants in the 
foregoing cases not solely lent moral support or encouragement to the perpetrators of the 
crime, but they also held some kind of authority (Akayesu as mayor of the commune where 
the atrocities occurred) or roles in the management of the concentration camps. Accordingly, 
1  Prosecutor v Furundžija Case no IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, 10 December 1998) para 202.
2  Prosecutor v Furundžija Case no IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, 10 December 1998) paras 203–204.
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the Trial Chamber held based on the foregoing cases that the nature of the assistance 
provided by the aider and abettor can be psychological support of the perpetrator coupled 
with some form of authority.
As regards the effect of the assistance provided by the aider and abettor on the act of 
the principal perpetrator, the Trial Chamber discussed additional post-World War II cases, 
such as the Einsatzgruppen, the Zyklon B and the S. et al. (“Hechingen Deportation”) 
cases. Based on the assessment of the respective judgements, the Trial Chamber came to the 
conclusion that without substantial infl uence on the commission of the crime, mens rea 
alone is not suffi cient ground for a criminal conviction. It is essential for criminal liability 
under the concept of aiding and abetting that the assistance provided to the perpetrator has a 
substantial effect on the commission of the criminal offence.3
Following the 11-page long analysis of the case-law, the judgement provides a 
summary and discussion of the relevant international instruments. Article 2(3)(d) of the 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted in 1996 by the 
International Law Commission provided that the individual who “knowingly aids, abets or 
otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of […] a crime, including 
providing the means for its commission” shall be held criminally responsible as an aider 
and abettor.4 The Trial Chamber added with regard to assisting ex post facto and based on 
the relevant Commentary of the International Law Commission, that “willingness to provide 
assistance, when made known to the perpetrator, would also suffi ce, if the offer or help in 
fact encouraged or facilitated the commission of the crime by the main perpetrator”.5 The 
Chamber emphasized that the ILC Commentary mentions that the assistance of the aider 
and abettor facilitates the commission of the crime “in some signifi cant way”. Consequently, 
the Chamber held that the assistance need not be a conditio sine qua non of the crime, 
however, the wording of the ILC clearly excludes cases of marginal participation.6
Based on the above considerations, the Trial Chamber drew the fi nal conclusion that 
none of the cases which were discussed suggested that the acts of the accomplice need to be 
in a causal relationship with the criminal offence committed by the principal perpetrator. 
The actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical 
assistance, encouragement, or moral support, which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime.7
2. A “LANDMINE” PLANTED BY THE TADIĆ APPEALS CHAMBER
In 1999, the Tadić Appeals Chamber created a brand new concept for co-perpetration, 
namely the Joint Criminal Enterprise (hereinafter, JCE) as a result of extensive judicial 
activism. While setting up the elements of the defi nition of this controversial and broadly 
criticized concept, the Chamber also made a comparison between the concept of JCE and 
that of aiding and abetting. The Chamber identifi ed the following distinctive features:
3  Prosecutor v Furundžija Case no IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, 10 December 1998) paras 217–224.
4  Report of the ILC, on the work of its forty-eighth session G.A. Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10) 1996, 18.
5  Prosecutor v Furundžija Case no IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, 10 December 1998) para 230.
6  Prosecutor v Furundžija Case no IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, 10 December 1998) para 231.
7  Prosecutor v Furundžija Case no IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, 10 December 1998) paras 233–235.
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(i)  The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, 
the principal.
(ii)  In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of a common 
concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No plan or agreement is 
required: indeed, the principal may not even know about the accomplice’s contribution.
(iii)  The aider and abettor carries out acts specifi cally directed to assist, encourage or lend 
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specifi c crime […], and this support has a 
substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. […]
(iv)  In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the 
acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specifi c crime by 
the principal.8
This defi nition of the Appeals Chamber on the actus reus of aiding and abetting is 
identical with the one applied by the Furundžija Trial Chamber in the elements of (1) 
assistance, moral support or encouragement, and (2) its substantial effect upon the 
perpetration of the crime. At the same time, and without in-depth or any kind of legal 
analysis and failing to assess the existing norms of customary international law, the Appeals 
Chamber added in some kind of negligent style that the acts of the aider and abettor shall be 
specifi cally directed to assist the commission of a certain specifi c crime. Even though, as 
seen under paragraph (iv), the Chamber applied the mens rea standard rooted in customary 
international law, it arbitrarily and without any underlining or convincing reasoning 
implicitly (while discussing actus reus) lifted the mens rea threshold for aiding and abetting 
liability.
This negligent act of the Chamber of creating a new standard through judicial law-
making did not have a direct and signifi cant impact on the case in question, since the 
accused Tadić, the former President of the Local Board of the Serb Democratic Party in 
Kozarac, directly participated in the commission of murder, torture and inhuman treatment, 
and the collection and forced transfer of civilians to detention camps, where they were held 
in unlawful confi nement. For his conviction, the application of the concept of aiding and 
abetting was not required. Accordingly, without any urgent need for applying the concept, 
the Appeals Chamber modifi ed its defi nition with the sole purpose of crystallizing the newly 
created JCE concept through distinction from other forms of liability. By this act, the Tadić 
Appeals Chamber planted a “landmine” in the fi eld of future jurisdiction.
3. APPEALS CHAMBER FAILING TO DEACTIVATE THE “LANDMINE”: FROM 
THE ALEKSOVSKI TO THE LUKIĆ CASE
The Appeals Chamber had 13 years to deactivate the “landmine” planted by the Tadić 
Appeal Judgement in 1999 before it exploded. The Chamber failed to do so. The repetitive 
citation of the defi nition set by the Furundžija was justifi able until 2004 to a certain extent, 
even though further and deeper analysis of customary international law and preceding 
judicial bodies conducted by the Appeals Chamber could have enhanced the fi nding of the 
Furundžija Trial Chamber. Accordingly, the 13 years of passivity can be divided into two 
sections: (1) until the 2004 Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, when the Furundžija standards 
8  Prosecutor v Tadić Case no IT-94-1-A (ICTY, 15 July 1999) para 229.
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were applied in all Appeal procedure, and (2) the second section following 2004, when the 
Tadić “specifi cally directed” requirement was approved by another Appeals Chamber.
From the fi rst period, two relevant judgements delivered by the Appeals Chamber need 
to be mentioned. These are the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement and the Čelebići Appeal 
Judgement delivered in 2000 and 2001. In both cases, the Appeals Chamber approved the 
fi nding and reasoning of the Furundžija Trial Chamber. In accordance with this approach, 
the Aleksovski Appeal Chamber pointed out that “what must be shown is that the aider and 
abettor was aware of the essential elements of the crime which was ultimately committed 
by the principal”.9 Although the Chamber failed to extend the research and assessment of 
customary international law done by the Furundžija Trial Chamber, it explicitly discussed 
the wording of the Tadić Appeals Chamber with regard to aiding and abetting, and made the 
following signifi cant statement: “in the Tadic Judgement, the Appeals Chamber briefl y 
considered the liability of one person for the acts of another person where the fi rst person 
has been charged with aiding and abetting that other person in the commission of the crime. 
This was in the context of contrasting that liability with the liability of a person charged 
with acting pursuant to a common purpose or design with another person to commit a 
crime, and for that reason that judgement does not purport to be a complete statement of the 
liability of the person charged with aiding and abetting.”10 By this holding, the Aleksovski 
Appeals Chamber distanced itself from the wording of the Tadić Appeals Chamber, even if 
it failed to go into more detailed discussion on the issue of why the unjustifi ed element 
added to the defi nition cannot be accepted, and what kind of risks it might lead to in the 
assessment of the liability of future accused.
The Appeals Chamber in the “Čelebići Camp” case had to focus on another aspect of 
the application of the concept of aiding and abetting due to the fact that the defence of 
Appellant Delalić raised the argument in their Appeal Brief that the indictment did not 
charge him with aiding and abetting but instead used the word “participation” for his 
liability. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber was called to explain in detail why the concept of 
aiding and abetting can fi t into the broader notion of “participation”. The Chamber put so 
little emphasis on the issue of the defi nition of the concept, that it referred to the Tadić 
Appeals Judgement as one which would underpin the defi nition applied by the Trial 
Chamber (following the Furundžija standard), and as such, it failed to point out the mistaken 
interpretation of the concept provided by the Tadić Appeals Chamber. It simply ignored the 
problematic part of the Tadić defi nition.11
The Vasiljević Appeal Judgement delivered in 2004 can be interpreted as a turning 
point in the process of assessing aiding and abetting by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY. 
Until then, the Tadić defi nition had not entered the fi ndings of the Appeals Chamber in 
other cases. Just like in the above presented cases, the Vasiljević Appeals Chamber did not 
provide any in-depth analysis on the issue, referred to the Tadić Appeals Judgement in order 
to underpin the classical actus reus requirement of the “substantial effect upon the 
perpetration of the crime”, and then, without any detailed explanation, it held that “the acts 
of the Appellant were specifi cally directed to assist the perpetration of the murders and the 
inhumane acts and his support had a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the 
crimes”.12This unnecessary verbatim citation of the Tadić Appeals Judgement including the 
  9  Prosecutor v Aleksovski Case no IT-95-14/1-A (ICTY, 24 March 2000) para 162 (ii).
10  Prosecutor v Aleksovski Case no IT-95-14/1-A (ICTY, 24 March 2000) para 163.
11  Prosecutor v Mucić et al. Case no IT-96-21-A (ICTY, 20 February 2001) para 352.
12  Prosecutor v Vasiljević Case no IT-98-32-A (ICTY, 25 February 2004) para 135.
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mistaken “specifi cally directed” element was just like stepping on the mine fi eld, detecting 
the landmine but instead of deactivating it, just ignorantly passing by.
In the specifi c case, this failure did not have a great signifi cance, since the facts of the 
case clearly demonstrated a strong basis for conviction under the concept of aiding and 
abetting. Vasiljević, member of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary unit, the “White Eagles”, 
held seven Muslim men at the Vilina Vlas Hotel in Višegrad and walked with them to the 
Drina River, pointed his gun at them shortly before they were shot by the principal 
perpetrators. These acts of the defendant provided a solid ground even for the application of 
the “specifi cally directed” judge-made requirement, and did not demand the thorough 
analysis of the actual legal basis of the concept. At the same time, adapting a criterion 
which was rejected earlier by the Aleksovski Appeals Chamber expressis verbis, and failing 
to come up with a detailed reasoning underpinning this standpoint, can be seen as a serious 
gap in the judicial reasoning. From this time on, whenever the Appeals Chamber applied 
the form of liability of aiding and abetting, it had to face confl icting previous decisions, and 
therefore, it was obliged to determine which decision it would follow, or whether it would 
depart from both confl icting decisions for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.13
Since the defendant Jokić submitted the argument with regard to the legal element of 
actus reus of aiding and abetting that the practical assistance given to the perpetrators, in 
addition to having substantial effect on the commission of the crime, must be specifi cally 
directed to this end, the Appeals Chamber had to discuss the issue of the Tadić criteria in 
the Blagojević et al. case in more detail. The Appeal Judgement of 2007 includes the same 
conclusion as the one previously drawn by the Aleksovski Appeals Chamber, namely, that 
the statement at issue to be found in the Tadić Appeal Judgement “followed a discussion of 
the mens rea and actus reus of joint criminal enterprise liability and was introduced for the 
purpose of distinguishing aiding and abetting from acting in pursuance of a common 
purpose or design to commit a crime, the latter requiring only that the participant perform 
acts that are “in some way directed” to the furtherance of the common plan or purpose.”14 
The Chamber assessed the preceding relevant case-law of the ICTY. It emphasized that the 
Appeals Chamber had already assessed in the Blaškić case whether the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting requires a causal link between the act of the accused and the act of the principal 
perpetrator and found that it was not required. In addition, it considered the fi ndings of the 
Appeals Chamber in the Vasiljević and the Čelebići cases,15 but failed to make an in-depth 
analysis to fi nally give a detailed and convincing answer to the question of why the 
Furundžija standard should be followed in any cases of aiding and abetting.
The Appeals Chamber failed to deactivate the “landmine” also in the Mrkšić and the 
Lukić cases. Both Appeal Judgements (delivered in 2009 and 2012) reject the requirement 
of “specifi c direction” but none of them demonstrates a deeper analysis of precedents of 
international criminal law or customary international law. In the Mrkšić case, the Appeals 
Chamber simply reiterated that “it is not necessary that the aider and abettor knows the 
precise crime that was intended and was in fact committed, if he is aware that one of a 
number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is committed, he 
has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and 
abettor.”16 Therefore, one can see it as an exaggeration when the Appeals Chamber 
13  Prosecutor v Aleksovski Case no IT-95-14/1-A (ICTY, 24 March 2000) para 111.
14  Prosecutor v Blagojević&Jokić Case no IT-02-60-A (ICTY, 9 May 2007) para 185.
15  Prosecutor v Blagojević&Jokić Case no IT-02-60-A (ICTY, 9 May 2007) paras 184–191.
16  Prosecutor v Mrkšić&Šljivančanin Case no IT-95-13/1-A (ICTY, 5 May 2009) para 159.
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concluded in the Lukić & Lukić case that in the Mrkšić case the Appeals Chamber “has 
clarifi ed (sic!) that ‘specifi c direction’ is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting and fi nds that there is no ‘cogent reasonʼ to depart from this 
jurisprudence”.17 How could the Appeals Chamber possibly come to such a conclusion 
without in-depth analysis and thorough assessment of customary international law?
4. EXPLOSION OF THE “LANDMINE”: THE PERIŠIĆ CASE
Momčilo Perišić served as Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff from 1993 to 1995. 
The Yugoslav Army provided logistical assistance to the Army of the Republika Srpska 
(hereinafter, RS), including the supply of weapons, ammunition, personnel to whom the 
Yugoslav Army provided salaries. The war strategy in Sarajevo and Srebrenica led to the 
systematic perpetration of the well-known, horrifi c atrocities against civilians. Perišić was 
informed about the acts of violence against Bosnian Muslims perpetrated in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and that his actions provided practical assistance to the perpetrators of these 
crimes.
The judgment in his case was highly signifi cant also due to the fact that no high-level 
political or military stakeholder of the Yugoslav Army and Serbia has been convicted by the 
ICTY for war crimes committed on the territory of Bosnia.
In September 2011 the Trial Chamber found Perišić guilty as an aider and abettor of 
murder, inhumane acts and persecution as crimes against humanity and violations of laws 
and customs of war committed in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Zagreb. He was sentenced to 27 
years imprisonment.18
The Appeals Chamber found an error of law in the reasoning of the Trial Chamber, 
namely that the Trial Chamber stated that the element of “specifi c direction” is not needed 
for the actus reus of aiding and abetting. The Appeals Chamber arrived to a contrary 
conclusion maintaining that it must be proven that the assistance provided by the accused 
was specifi cally directed to facilitate the commission of the specifi c crimes.19
The Appeals Chamber held that it was “not persuaded that [the] Mrkšić […] Appeal 
judgment refl ected an intention to depart from the settled precedent established by the Tadić 
Appeal judgment.”20 In addition, the Chamber emphasized that if the aider/abettor was not 
present at the commission of the crime and remote from the relevant crime an explicit 
consideration of specifi c direction is required. Thereafter, without going into deeper analysis 
of the concept and customary international law on aiding and abetting, and solely relying 
automatically on the Tadić judgment, the Chamber concluded that specifi c direction could 
not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Army of RS was not a criminal organization 
per se. It was an army fi ghting war. Assistance provided to the army’s general war efforts 
does not, in itself, demonstrate that assistance facilitated by Perišić was specifi cally directed 
to aid the crimes committed by members of the Army of RS.21
The Appeals Chamber, therefore, acquitted Perišić on all counts of the indictment. The 
judgment of the Chamber is far from convincing. Contrary to its reasoning and as presented 
above, preceding judicial chambers on the concept of aiding and abetting pointed out that 
17  Prosecutor v Lukić&Lukić Case no IT-98-32/1-A (ICTY, 4 December 2012) para 424.
18  Prosecutor v Perišić Case no IT-04-81-T (ICTY, 6 September 2011)
19  Prosecutor v Perišić Case no IT-04-81-A (ICTY, 28 February 2013) paras 13–74.
20  Prosecutor v Perišić Case no IT-04-81-A (ICTY, 28 February 2013) para 32.
21  Prosecutor v Perišić Case no IT-04-81-A (ICTY, 28 February 2013) paras 25–69.
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knowledge about the specifi c crimes is suffi cient to maintain the mens rea element. It must 
be proven that the accused was aware of the fact that the principal perpetrator used the 
assistance provided by the accused for the purpose of engaging in criminal conduct.22 
Knowledge has been required about the fact that the assistance provided support to the 
perpetrator to commit the crimes. By insisting on the requirement of the “specifi c direction”, 
the Appeals Chamber raised the threshold for the mens rea element of aiding and abetting 
liability. This undermines the purpose of the whole concept, namely, to facilitate criminal 
accountability of those responsible for knowingly facilitating the commission of 
international crimes (obviously resulting in lesser sentences than in the case of perpetrators 
such as members of a JCE).
The systematic and widespread sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo in the 
period of over 3 years made it obvious that the Army of the RS relied on criminal acts to 
further its siege. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt that Perišić provided signifi cant 
logistical assistance to this Army and had the power to approve or deny aid requests from 
the Army of RS. Without this aid, the Army of RS could not have operated effectively as an 
army. Therefore, the assistance provided by Perišić had a substantial effect on the crimes 
perpetrated by the Army of RS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Perišić was informed from a 
variety of sources about the criminal conduct of the Army of RS (not only through 
diplomatic channels, since the atrocities had a wide media coverage), and he nonetheless 
continued to provide support. In spite of all the foregoing circumstances, he was acquitted 
based on the requirement of “specifi c direction” introduced by the Tadić Appeal Chamber. 
The “landmine” exploded due to the fact that a number of judicial chambers had failed to 
take the effort to deactivate it.
Table 1. Summary of the discussed judgements concerning “specifi c direction” 
“Specifi c Direction” Required “Specifi c Direction” NOT Required
Furundžija TJ (1998)
Tadić AJ (1999)
Aleksovski AJ (2000)
Čelebići AJ (2001)
Vasiljević AJ (2004)
Blagojević AJ (2007)
Mrkšić AJ (2009)
Lukić AJ (2012)
Perišić AJ (2013)
Sainović AJ (2014)
22  See Prosecutor v Perišić Case no IT-04-81-A (ICTY, 28 February 2013), Partially dissenting 
opinion of Judge Liu.
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Table 2. Members of the judicial chambers
Furundžija TC Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba (presiding), Antonio Cassese, Richard May
Tadić AC Mohamed Shahabuddeen (presiding), Antonio Cassese, Wang Tieya, 
Rafael Nieto-Navia, Florence Mumba
Aleksovski AC Richard May (presiding), Florence Mumba, David Hunt, Wang Tieya, 
Patrick Robinson
Čelebići AC David Hunt (presiding), Fouad Riad, Rafael Nieto-Navia, Mohamed Bennouna, 
FaustoPocar
Vasiljević AC Theodor Meron (presiding), Wolfgang Schomburg, Mohamed Shahabuddeen, 
Mehmet Güney, Inés Mónica
Blagojević AC Fausto Pocar (presiding), Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Mehmet Güney, AndrésiaVaz, 
Theodor Meron
Mrkšić AC Theodor Meron (presiding), Mehmet Güney, FaustoPocar, Liu Daqun, AndrésiaVaz
Lukić AC Mehmet Güney (presiding), FaustoPocar, Liu Daqun, Carmel Agius, 
Howard Morrison
Perišić AC Theodor Meron (presiding), Carmel Agius, Liu Daqun (dissenting), AndrésiaVaz, 
Arlette Ramaroson
Sainović AC Liu Daqun (presiding), Mehmet Güney, Fausto Pocar, Arlette Ramaroson, 
Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov
5. EPILOGUE – CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT PROVIDED 
BY THE SAINOVIĆ APPEALS CHAMBER
The acquittal of Perišić received great exposure in both the affected countries and the 
international media. The intense reaction of the society, apart from the interests of justice, 
provided another pressing need for the clarifi cation of the concept. The community of 
experts and lay persons who kept an eye on the fate of the harmful “specifi c direction” 
theory did not need to wait for long until a case appeared where the concept of aiding and 
abetting had to be applied. The Appeals Chamber (with Judge Liu Daqun presiding who 
was also a member of the Perišić Appeals Chamber, and attached a dissenting opinion to 
that judgement) took the opportunity to clarify once and for all for the ICTY jurisdiction 
what existing customary international law says about the liability of an aider and abettor. It 
emphasized in its judgement delivered in 2014 in the Sainović case, as a starting point of its 
analysis of the relevant case-law of the ICTY, that primary consideration should be given to 
positions expressly taken and clearly set out in the judgements concerned.23 It clearly 
rejected the opinion of the majority of the Perišić Appeals Chamber, and concluded that the 
requirement of substantial contribution had been the consistent element of the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting and correctly found that even though the Furundžija Trial Judgement 
elicited the defi nition from an analysis of customary international law, there was nonetheless 
a need for the re-examination of customary international law in order to dispel any doubt 
with regard to the elements of aiding and abetting.24 It not only extended the analysis 
provided by the Furundžija Trial Chamber on post-World War II cases, but also assessed the 
23  Prosecutor v Sainović et al. Case no IT-05-87-A (ICTY,23 January 2014) para 1621.
24  Prosecutor v Sainović et al. Case no IT-05-87-A (ICTY,23 January 2014) paras 1618–1626.
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question of whether domestic laws of the major legal systems of the world accept and adopt 
the same approach to the potential “specifi c direction” element of aiding and abetting 
liability. It elaborated upon the national legal framework applicable in a broad range of 
countries, such as Mexico, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, France, 
Belgium, Algeria, Morocco, Burundi, Germany, China, Bulgaria, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, etc., and came to the fi nal conclusion that requiring of “specifi c 
direction” has never been a general, uniform practice in national jurisdictions.25 The 
Appeals Chamber, thereby, excluded the possibility of future ICTY judicial chambers 
reactivating a “landmine” similar to the one planted by the Tadić Appeals Chamber. Any 
judge who nonetheless tries to do so aiming for the extension of the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting, should be prepared to demonstrate a detaile d and convincing reasoning as 
opposed to the Sainović Appeal Judgement, which provides a clear and thorough analysis 
of customary international law.
25  Prosecutor v Sainović et al. Case no IT-05-87-A (ICTY,23 January 2014) paras 1643–1646.
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